Table of Contents
Deterrence, Compellence and Containment
Introduction
Deterrence, compellence and containment are major concepts in international security and strategic studies. They describe different ways in which states attempt to influence the behaviour of other states, armed groups or strategic competitors.
Deterrence seeks to prevent an action by threatening unacceptable consequences. Compellence seeks to make an actor undertake, stop or reverse an action. Containment seeks to limit the expansion of an adversary’s influence, power or strategic reach without necessarily seeking its complete defeat.
These concepts are closely associated with military strategy, nuclear politics, great-power rivalry and foreign policy. They are also useful for understanding the Cold War, nuclear deterrence, regional security competition and contemporary strategic rivalry.
Core Concepts
Deterrence is the strategy of discouraging an adversary from taking a particular action by convincing it that the expected costs will outweigh the expected benefits.
The central logic is:
If you take action X, the consequences will be sufficiently costly that you should refrain from doing so.
Deterrence does not necessarily require the actual use of force. The credibility of the threatened response is often more important than its actual execution.
Deterrent threat refers to a threat intended to prevent an adversary from taking an action.
Deterrence by punishment seeks to discourage an action by threatening retaliation or imposing unacceptable costs after the prohibited action occurs.
Deterrence by denial seeks to prevent an adversary from achieving its objectives by making the intended action unlikely to succeed.
For example, strengthening defensive capabilities may deter an attack by reducing the attacker’s expectation of success.
Extended deterrence occurs when one state seeks to deter attacks against another state, usually an ally or security partner.
Nuclear alliances frequently involve extended deterrence.
Nuclear deterrence is deterrence based on the threat or potential use of nuclear weapons. Its logic rests heavily on the enormous costs associated with nuclear conflict.
Mutual deterrence exists when two adversaries possess capabilities that allow each to impose unacceptable costs on the other.
Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) describes a strategic condition in which opposing nuclear powers retain sufficient retaliatory capability to destroy each other following a nuclear attack.
Second-strike capability is the ability of a state to retaliate effectively after absorbing an initial nuclear attack.
A credible second-strike capability strengthens deterrence because an adversary cannot reasonably expect to eliminate the opponent’s retaliatory forces in a first strike.
Compellence
Compellence is the use or threatened use of force, punishment or pressure to make an adversary change its existing behaviour.
The basic logic is:
You are doing X. Stop, reverse or change X, or face consequences.
Compellence therefore differs from deterrence.
Deterrence attempts to prevent an action.
Compellence attempts to change an action already underway or force a new action.
Examples may include demanding that a state withdraw military forces from disputed territory, release detained personnel or end a particular military operation.
Compellent threat is a threat designed to force an adversary to take or cease a particular action.
Coercive diplomacy combines diplomatic communication with credible threats or limited incentives to influence an adversary’s behaviour.
Ultimatum is a coercive demand accompanied by a specified deadline or threatened consequence.
Containment
Containment is a strategy designed to restrict the expansion of an adversary’s political, military, ideological or economic influence.
The concept became strongly associated with United States strategy toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
Containment does not necessarily require the destruction of an adversary. Its objective may instead be to prevent expansion and limit strategic opportunities.
Strategic containment refers to efforts to constrain the geographic or strategic expansion of a rival.
Economic containment uses trade restrictions, financial measures, sanctions or restrictions on strategic technology to limit an adversary’s capabilities.
Military containment involves alliances, forward deployments, military assistance, defensive positions or other capabilities intended to restrict an adversary’s strategic movement.
Political containment seeks to limit an adversary’s diplomatic influence or access to international institutions and partnerships.
Credibility and Signalling
Credibility is central to deterrence and compellence. A threat is more credible when an adversary believes that the threatening state possesses both the capability and willingness to carry it out.
Capability refers to the ability to impose the threatened consequences.
Resolve refers to the perceived willingness to use available capabilities.
Strategic signalling involves actions or statements intended to communicate intentions, capabilities or red lines to an adversary.
Red line refers to a condition or action that a state declares unacceptable and potentially subject to retaliation.
Cost signalling involves deliberately demonstrating the willingness to bear costs in order to communicate resolve.
Escalation and Risk
Deterrence and compellence can create escalation risks when adversaries respond to threats with counter-threats or military preparations.
Escalation is an increase in the intensity, geographic scope or political stakes of a confrontation.
Escalation dominance refers to a perceived ability to control or prevail at successive levels of escalation.
Escalation ladder is a conceptual representation of progressively more serious levels of confrontation.
Crisis stability exists when opposing states have incentives to avoid initiating actions that could produce uncontrolled escalation.
Inadvertent escalation occurs when actions intended for one purpose unintentionally trigger a stronger response.
Key Distinctions
| Concept | Primary objective | Basic logic |
|---|---|---|
| Deterrence | Prevent an action | Do not do X |
| Compellence | Change behaviour | Stop or do X |
| Containment | Limit expansion | Do not expand beyond current position |
| Punishment | Impose costs | Action will bring retaliation |
| Denial | Prevent success | Action will not achieve its objective |
| Coercive diplomacy | Influence behaviour | Change behaviour through pressure and negotiation |
Key Terms at a Glance
Deterrence: Preventing an action through threatened consequences.
Deterrence by punishment: Threatening retaliation.
Deterrence by denial: Making an adversary’s objective unlikely to succeed.
Extended deterrence: Protecting another state through deterrent commitments.
Nuclear deterrence: Deterrence based on nuclear capabilities.
Second-strike capability: Ability to retaliate after absorbing an attack.
Compellence: Forcing an actor to change behaviour.
Coercive diplomacy: Diplomacy backed by credible pressure.
Containment: Restricting the expansion of an adversary.
Credibility: Perceived ability and willingness to carry out a threat.
Strategic signalling: Communication of intentions and resolve.
Escalation: Increase in the intensity of confrontation.
Related Glossaries
This topic is closely connected with 9.1 International and National Security, 9.3 Security Dilemma and Strategic Stability, 9.5 Collective Security and Collective Defence, 9.6 Hybrid Warfare and Grey-Zone Competition, 11.1 Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Strategy, and 11.2 Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability.